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Summary
Switzerland is among the countries with the highest num-
ber of coronavirus disease-2019 (COVID-19) cases per
capita in the world. There are likely many people with
undetected SARS-CoV-2 infection because testing efforts
are currently not detecting all infected people, including
some with clinical disease compatible with COVID-19.
Testing on its own will not stop the spread of SARS-CoV-2.
Testing is part of a strategy. The World Health Organiza-
tion recommends a combination of measures: rapid diag-
nosis and immediate isolation of cases, rigorous tracking
and precautionary self-isolation of close contacts. In this
article, we explain why the testing strategy in Switzerland
should be strengthened urgently, as a core component of
a combination approach to control COVID-19.
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Introduction
“You cannot fight a fire blindfolded. And we cannot stop
this pandemic if we don’t know who is infected.” (World
Health Organization Director-General, 16 March 2020).
Switzerland is among the countries with the highest num-
ber of coronavirus disease-2019 (COVID-19) cases per
capita in the world. As of 18 March 2020, the Swiss Fed-
eral Office of Public Health had reported 2772 confirmed
COVID-19 cases and 21 deaths. The epidemiological sit-
uation is clear: the virus that causes COVID-19, Severe
Acute Respiratory Syndrome Coronavirus 2 (SARS-
CoV-2) is spreading rapidly through the Swiss population,
and the number of patients suffering from COVID-19 is
following the spread of the virus, with a predictable delay.
There are likely many people with undetected SARS-
CoV-2 infection because testing efforts are currently not
detecting all infected people, including some with clinical
disease compatible with COVID-19. The Swiss govern-
ment announced important and drastic new social-distanc-
ing measures on Monday, 16 March 2020 to fight further
propagation of this novel virus. In this article, we explain
why the testing strategy in Switzerland should be strength-
ened urgently, as a core component of a combination ap-
proach to control COVID-19.
The spread of SARS-CoV-2 must be slowed dramatically
and immediately. The Italian situation demonstrates how
quickly the healthcare system can be overwhelmed. The
number of deaths from COVID-19 in Italy (2978 by 18
March 2020) is already approaching that in the whole of
China (3245) [1]. The fact that many patients deteriorate to
a critical state and require intensive care for significantly
more than one week is particularly concerning [2]. Basic
epidemiological models of the spread of the SARS-CoV-2
virus suggest that, owing to its contagiousness and the lack
of immunity in the population, 40−70% of the population
could become infected unless strong measures are taken
[3]. Data from China and Italy indicate that a sizable frac-
tion (5−10%) of the symptomatic cases will need hospi-
talisation [4]. The overall fraction of SARS-CoV-2 infec-
tions that cause serious illness or death is still uncertain,
but mortality from COVID-19 increases with age [3] and
exceeds that from seasonal influenza.
Until an efficacious and safe vaccine becomes available −
with even the most optimistic estimates putting this at 9 to
18 months − the only way to prevent the above scenario
is to control the spread of SARS-CoV-2. While strict so-
cial distancing measures are necessary, nobody can imag-
ine such measures being enforceable for extended periods
of time. In the absence of pharmaceutical measures, the on-
ly way to return more quickly to a normal life is to keep the
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spread of the virus under control by preventing transmis-
sion, and with active, forceful and rapid extinction of lo-
cal outbreaks. A liberal strategy for testing, contact tracing
and subsequent self-isolation of individuals who test pos-
itive for SARS-CoV-2, and precautionary self-isolation of
close contacts, is critical to achieve this goal.
Testing on its own will not stop the spread of SARS-
CoV-2. Testing is part of a strategy. The World Health Or-
ganization recommends a combination of measures: rapid
diagnosis and immediate isolation of cases, rigorous track-
ing and precautionary self-isolation of close contacts. An
exceptionally high degree of population understanding and
acceptance of these measures are critical for countries with
ongoing outbreaks [2]. This strategy means that testing
must be widely available and the barriers to testing have to
be as low as possible, with testing facilities located outside
of hospitals to prevent overburden of hospital resources
and the risk of nosocomial transmission to other patients
and healthcare workers. To change the epidemiological dy-
namics of the SARS-CoV-2 epidemic, the current testing
recommendation in Switzerland, which is limited to the
vulnerable population or patients requiring hospitalisation,
needs to be adapted. While the protective effort must be
focused on the vulnerable population, the general popula-
tion must play the central role in this mitigation effort from
an epidemiological perspective. Otherwise, the vulnerable
population will continue to face very high exposure from
the general population. In this document, we use the term
“precautionary self-isolation of contacts” to mean “quaran-
tine”, the term used by the World Health Organization [3].
Why test and isolate?
Switzerland should dramatically upscale its testing capa-
bilities and facilities. In this article, we assume the tests in
use for detection of SARS-CoV-2 are validated. We also
recognise that there are currently limits to the capacity of
test centres and existing diagnostic laboratories in terms
of personnel and reagents. In particular, disruption to the
production and supply of laboratory reagents only a few
weeks into the epidemic shows how severely global diag-
nostic preparedness has been neglected in recent years. A
liberal testing strategy has direct and clear benefits:
1. Testing, followed by contact tracing and isolation of
those with positive test results has been applied by
all countries that have managed to keep the SARS-
CoV-2 virus in check. The epidemiological reasoning
is straightforward. Current estimates of the basic re-
production number R0 of COVID-19 are around 2−3
[5]. To bend the epidemic curve downwards (which
will only happen once the effective reproduction num-
ber R <1), we must prevent 50−70% of possible trans-
missions [6]. Isolation of cases and precautionary self-
isolation of contacts are key measures to do that, and
the COVID-19 experience from other countries
demonstrates that forcefully. Following a positive test
result, that person should be isolated to prevent onward
transmission. The person’s close contacts should be
followed up and advised to go into precautionary self-
isolation, unless a risk/benefit analysis deems this
counterproductive. These measures can prevent a large
fraction of possible transmission chains.
2. The Republic of South Korea has had a large epidemic
of COVID-19, the cumulative number of cases ex-
ceeded 1000 on 26 February [1]. A central part of
the control strategy was widespread and easily acces-
sible SARS-CoV-2 testing, linked to contact tracing,
and self-isolation. The epidemic curve suggests that
the control strategy in South Korea has curtailed the
epidemic. The number of new cases peaked on 29 Feb-
ruary and had fallen to 84 by 17 March.
3. COVID-19 cases begin with mild symptoms, which
peak, on average, 8−10 days after onset. Testing will
detect infectious individuals, and will detect clusters,
allowing contact tracing and precautionary self-isola-
tion of contacts. More widespread testing will allow
a more accurate estimate of the case fatality ratio, ac-
knowledging that the time between disease onset and
death is several weeks.
4. Accurate data about the extent of SARS-CoV-2 are es-
sential for robust estimation and preparation of hospi-
tal resources and ICU bed requirements. Widespread
testing for SARS-CoV-2 will allow a clear picture of
the epidemiological situation on the ground to be ob-
tained. It is incredibly difficult to manage a crisis with-
out knowing the extent of the problem. It is partic-
ularly important to know more about the number of
people affected in Switzerland, and what proportions
have mild, severe and critical symptoms.
5. Ongoing monitoring of the results of SARS-CoV-2
testing will allow us to get a clear temporal picture
of the dynamic of the COVID-19 epidemic. Without
clear numbers, it will be extremely difficult to assess
whether control measures were effective, and at which
time point it is necessary to modify such measures.
6. A system for antibody testing (serology) will also need
to be implemented at large-scale as soon as possible.
Antibody testing provides additional information to
that obtained from polymerase chain-reaction (PCR)
detection of active infection. Antibody testing is the
only way to reliably establish the fraction of the popu-
lation that was infected by the virus − albeit with a de-
lay of a few weeks. A cohort of people with document-
ed infection should be monitored to determine the time
to seroconversion, providing crucial input for large-
scale testing. People with suspected exposure, health-
care workers in particular, should be tested as high an-
tibody titres likely mean that they are no longer at risk
of contracting or spreading the disease and can be pref-
erentially employed in high-risk areas.
Duration of isolation
Contact tracing identifies exposed contacts who need a
14-day period of precautionary self-isolation. Persons with
a positive SARS-Cov-2 test result need to immediately
self-isolate. Those with severe symptoms need to be treat-
ed with all the needed precautions. Current evidence indi-
cates that “97.5% of those who develop symptoms will do
so within 11.5 days” after time of infection, with further
analysis finding that “the current period of active moni-
toring recommended by the US Centers for Disease Con-
trol and Prevention (14 days) is well supported by the ev-
idence” [7]. Repeated testing could reduce the period of
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precautionary self-isolation. The current recommendation
from the Swiss Federal Office of Public Health for contacts
of confirmed COVID-19 cases needs clarification to state
whether the 5-day self-isolation period begins after symp-
tom onset in the index case, or after presumed exposure.
Conclusions
Although this document focuses on the epidemiological as-
pects of testing, there are economic and social benefits to a
liberal testing strategy. The costs of increased testing, con-
tact tracing and self-isolation are high in the short term. In
the longer term, however, more rapid control will reduce
the economic and social costs of social-distancing mea-
sures that adversely affect businesses, communities and in-
dividuals. A liberal approach to testing for SARS-CoV-2
in Switzerland is needed as part of the package of control
measures. Liberal testing, contact tracing and self-isolation
will help to manage the crisis due to the spread of SARS-
CoV-2 infection and of severe or lethal COVID-19 disease
until pharmaceutical interventions (vaccination to prevent
infection, or treatments for COVID-19) are available. Oth-
er countries, South Korea in particular, have demonstrated
it. Fully acknowledging the operational challenges, rapid
and determined prevention of transmission through the ap-
proach outlined here is - in our assessment - needed to
maintain a relatively open society and economy while min-
imizing the damage to the health of the population.
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